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A MINISTRY OF JUSTICE IN ACTION
The Work of the New York State Law Revision Commission
BERNARD L. SHIENTAG

While the Lord Chancellor, in Gilbertian fashion, still sings that "the law is
the true embodiment of everything that's excellent" and that "it has no kind
of fault or flaw," we have long abandoned any attempt to maintain the position so complacently taken by Coke in the second part of the Institiftes that
the "Common Law ... is the absolute perfection of reason."
The pattern of the law and its administration have, especially since the
eighteenth century, been subjected to constant criticism. "A system that is
never censured," said Bentham, "will never be improved."'1 And this criticism, often uninformed, haphazard, and unscientific in character, has resulted
in notable improvement. We have come to understand that the law is a constant growth, adapting itself to new conditions and to the varying needs of
successive generations. Like all human institutions it has its elements of
strength and weakness, its virtues and its faults. For us in this country Mr.
Justice Holmes "with penetrating insight ... saw and revealed the'processes
by which the Common Law, when it fulfills its mission, is always adopting
new principles from life though never quite succeeding in discarding the debris
of outworn doctrines,-a consummation which could be attained only if
growth were to cease." 2
By the interaction of the judicial process and express legislation the continuous growth and development of the law are accomplished. It is true, as
Mr. Justice Holmes boldly proclaimed decades ago, that the judge is a legislator, that he enlarges and supplements the law, that he not only discovers
but often makes the law. Limits there are, however, often disappointingly
narrow, to this exercise of the judicial function. Respect for precedent, particularly in the domain of private relations, is the necessary foundation of
judge-made law. Relief from oppressive rules in this field must generally
be sought from the legislative branch of the government.
Our progress in connection with the reform of the substance of the law
has been slow. Anachronisms and outmoded legal rules have been permitted
'Quoted in

CLAUD MULLINS, IN QUEST OF JUSTICE (1931) 2.
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:
PAPERS (1936) xii.

'Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Introduction to
Booc NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND

His
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to remain although they have outlived their usefulness and in some instances
operate unjustly. This condition has been ascribed by some to the conservatism of the majority of the bench and bar, manifesting itself in indifference and even, at times, in active opposition to progressive legal innovations.
There is some basis for this criticism.
But there was a more fundamental and compelling reason for our slow
progress in the reform of the law in this state. There was no permanent
state agency whose function it was to undertake this task. What was everybody's business tended, except on sporadic occasions, to be nobody's business. In England, Bentham, Lord Westbury, and Lord Haldane pointed
out this deficiency. There the criticism was not so significant because the
Lord Chancellor, in addition to his judicial duties, had important administrativefunctions, and was looked upon as the responsible leader in matters pertaining to the reform of the law.3
In this state, the need for a permanent governmental law reform agency
was forcefully urged in 1921 by Mr. Justice Cardozo, then Associate Judge
of the Court of Appeals. In an address on A Ministry of Justice, he said:
"Today courts and legislature work in separation and aloofness. The
penalty is paid both in the wasted effort of production and in the lowered
quality of the product. On the one side, the judges, left to fight against
anachronism and injustice by the methods of judge-made law, are distracted by the conflicting promptings of justice and logic, of consistency
* and mercy, and the output of their labors bears the tokens of the strain.
On the other side, the legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice as to the workings of one
rule or another, patches the fabric here and there, and mars often when
it would mend. Legislature and courts move on in proud and silent isolation. Some agency must be found to mediate between them. This task
of mediation is that of a ministry of justice. The duty must be cast on
some man or .group of men to watch the law in action, observe the manner
of its functioning, and report the changes needed when function is deranged ....
In the end, of course, the recommendations of the ministry
will be recommendations and nothing more . . . . But at least the lines

of communication will be open. The long silence will
be broken.. The
'4
spaces between the planets will at last be bridged."
Inspired by this eloquent plea, various steps were taken, culminating in
1934 in the appointment of two permanent state agencies-a Law Revision
Commission to deal primarily with matters of substantive law, and a Judicial
Council to deal with procedural administration and the business of the courts.
No more far reaching or fundamental action was ever taken in this or any
"In 1933 the Lord Chancellor appointed a Standing Committee to determine whether
such legal rules as he may refer to it require revision in the light of modern conditions.
See ANNUAL SURVEY oir ENGLISH LAW (1933)

141.

'Justiqe Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 HAiv. L. REv. 113,
125, reprinted in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS (1931) 41, 42, 68.
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other state, looking towards the more efficient administration of justice. It
is with the work of the first of these agencies, the Law Revision Commission,
that this paper is concerned.
The Commission was charged with the following duties:
"1. To examine the common law and statutes of the state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms.
"2. To receive and consider proposed changes in the law recommended by the American Law Institute, the commissioners for the promotion
of uniformity of legislation in the United States, any bar association or
other learned bodies.
"3. To receive and consider suggestions from judges, justices, public
officials, lawyers, and the public generally as to defects and anachronisms
in the law.
"4. To recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it
deems necessary to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules
of law, and to bring the law of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony
with modem conditions."'5
The statute creating the Commission provided that it was to consist of
the Chairmen of the Committees on the judiciary of the Senate and the Assembly as members ex officio, and five additional members, to be appointed by
the Governor, four of whom were to be attorneys and at least two of whom
were to be professors of law. 6 The appointed members are Charles K.
Burdick, Dean of the Cornell Law School, Chairman; Wamick J. Keman,
of Utica, member of the law firm of Keman & Kernan; Walter H. Pollak,
a practicing attorney of New York City; Bruce Smith, staff member of the
Institute of Public Administration; Young B. Smith, Dean of the Columbia
Law School. The Commission was organized on July 31, 1934. It selected
as Executive Secretary and Director of Research, Professor John W. MacDonald, of the faculty of the Cornell Law School, and appointed a staff
of research assistants.
All proposals for revision made to the Commission or which its own research reveals are referred to a committee on projects, which in turn makes
recommendations to the Commission with regard to the disposition of the suggestions. 7 Once a subject is listed for immediate study, a subcommittee
'Laws 1934, c. 597.
"See Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, LEcuRas ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913)
366, 367, 368.
'The Commission has used the following formula to indicate the place of a project on

its calendar: I. Immediate Study: Projects being studied by Commission; I. Preferred
List: Subjects suggested to the Commission which are thought suitable for future study;
III. Reserved List: Subjects suggested to the Commission on which no action negative
or affirmative has been taken.
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is appointed by the Chairman, which acts with the Director of Research in
supervising the project. One or more members of the research staff are
assigned to assist each subcommittee and, in special fields, experts may be
called to consult with the subcommittee. The subcommittee meets periodically and reports its recommendations to the Commission.
In its first Report,8 the Commission advised that it had commenced a
study of necessary revisions in the Penal Law. This study is still in process
of completion, and it will probably be some years before it is ready for presentation to the Legislature. The Commission recommended a Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, which was vetoed by the Governor, later revised
to meet his objections, and enacted into law the following year.9 Thirteen
bills were introduced in the 1935 Legislature on the Commission's recommendation. All passed the Senate, eleven passed the Assembly, and nine became
law after signature by the Governor. Among the notable enactments,9 ' based
upon the studies and recommendations of the Commission, were those providing for the survival of tort actions' ° and that the contributory negligence of
parents or custodians should not be imputed to infants.1 ' The Commission
also presented several studies without any recommendation for legislation,
among them a study of the New York rule with regard to liability for prenatal
injuries. 12
Its second Report,'12 that for 1936, marks a further advance in the work
of the Commission. The scientific, scholarly, and painstaking character of
the research studies conducted, their importance and utility, the resultant
substantial reforms accomplished by way of remedial legislation, combine to
make the report extremely valuable to active practitioners and to students of
the law generally. The studies formulate the problems under consideration
clearly, trace the history of the various legal rules involved and the forces
that work upon them, point out how they operate in practice and their present social utility, and indicate how other states and foreign countries deal
with the same subject. The Commission has set about to avail itself of the
legal improvements made by our neighbors, in this respect bringing legal
science in closer harmony with physical science. No longer need we labor
under the reproach that the lawyer is "perhaps the only man of science who
does not look beyond his own commonwealth," and to whom the legal sys3
tems of other countries are closed doors.1
'Report, Recommendations, Studies of the Law Revision Commission, N. Y. LEG. Doc.
(1935) No. 60, at 12.
'Laws 1936, c. 892.
"For general discussion of the organization of the Commission and its work in 1935,
see MacDonald and Rosenzweig, The Law Revision Commission of the State of New
York &c. (1935) 20 CORNELL L. Q. 415.
"Laws 1935, c. 795.
'Laws 1935, c. 796.
"Supra note 8, at 449.
"'Infra note 15.
"I SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, ETC., OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, 491.
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The arrangement and paging of the volume make it easy for any lawyer
interested in a particular subject to obtain a separate reprint thereof from
the state printer at nominal expense. The bar will be shortsighted, indeed,
if it fails to avail itself widely of this opportunity.
In 1936 ten bills recommended by the Commissioner were enacted into
law.14 This legislation represents but a small portion of the work of the
Commission for this period. Among the subjects still being studied, and in
connection with which no recommendation was made to the Legislature in the
1936 Report, are the revision of the Penal Law, state and municipal liability
in tort (the recommendation made in 1936 dealing only with certain aspects
of highway liability and procedural requirements under the Court of Claims
6
Act),15 and the subject of the Statute of Limitations.'
From among the research studies submitted to the Legislature in 1936 the
following may be singled out for special mention:

1. Liability for injuriesresulting from fright or shock. This study was
very carefully prepared. It traces the history of the rule laid down for this
State in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 7 which denied recovery for injuries
brought about through the internal effects of fright or shock. The study
shows that the English courts and the majority of American jurisdictions
have either repudiated the rule denying recovery or have undermined it by
numerous exceptions. The American Law Institute in its Restatement of the
Law of Torts has adopted the rule permitting recovery.' 8 The study indicates that there is little basis for fear that by allowing recovery a flood of
non-meritorious litigation and successful prosecution of fraudulent claims
will result. After posing the problem, the study presents the state of the law
in Great Britain, on the Continent, and in the United States, enunciates and
evaluates the reasons against recovery, and goes into a detailed consideration
of how the rule denying recovery works in practice in different situations.
The bill recommended by the Commission provides as follows:
"In an action to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful death
hereafter caused, recovery shall not be denied merely because such bodi"Laws 1936, c. 892 (Criminal Extradition Act) ; Laws 1936, c. 685 (sealed instru-

ments) ; Laws 1936, c. 222 (releases) ; Laws 1936, c. 281 (written agreements without
consideration) ; Laws 1936, c. 731 (risk of loss in executing contract for sale of land) ;
Laws 1936, c. 252, infra note 24; Laws 1936, c. 433 (insolvency of insured as condition
to suit against insurer) ; Laws 1936, c. 189 (fourth offenders) ; Laws 1936, c. 385 (discharge of public improvement lien) ; Laws 1936, c. 330 (partnership law corrections).
'Report, Recommendations, Studies of the Law Revision Commission, N. Y. LEG. Doc.

(1936) No. 65, at 941.
"Supra note 15, at 20.

"151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
-§ 436.
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ly iiijury or wrongful death was brought about through fright or shock
without physical contact or impact."' 9
It failed to pass the Legislature. The present rule is unsound and operates
unjustly. It is to be hoped that the Commission will again recommend the
enactment of this bill to the present session of the Legislature.

2. Contribution among joint torfeasors and release of joint tortfeasors.*
In its excellent study of this subject the Commission points out that among
the anomalies in the English common law is the rule that, where one of several
joint tortfeasors has been held responsible for an injury, he has no right of
contribution against the other tortfeasors although they were equally liable for
the injury. If liability in tort rested solely on injury wilfully inflicted, or
existed only where the wrongful act was a crime, the rule would be understandable. But where it applies, as it does in most cases, to unintentional
injury, there is neither explanation nor justification for the rule. This is
particularly evident when it is seen that the rule has no application to wilful
breach of contract.
The rule was abolished in England in 1935, following the report of the
English Law Revision Committee, and several states in this country have
repudiated it. The Commission is right in believing that the "anachronistic
principle" of no contribution among joint tortfeasors should be eradicated as
a "thoroughly unfortunate and socially undesirable rule of law." Its bill
recommending contribution among joint tortfeasors contained provisions
dealing with the effect of a release given to one joint tortfeasor upon the
liability of the others and with their right of contribution from the one receiving the release. 20 These provisions were designed to facilitate bona fide settlements without penalizing either the injured person or the unreleased tortfeasors. The Commission's bill passed the Senate but failed of passage in the
Assembly. It should receive strong bar endorsement.

3. Liability of receivers in mortgage foreclosure for passive negligence.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals, following cases in the Appellate
Division, First Department, gives immunity to a receiver whose negligent
failure to make repairs causes injury. Recovery against a receiver is denied,
"Supra note 15, at 382.
*For a recent discussion of this subject, see Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1936) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 552.-Eu.
°Supra note 15, at 709.
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even out of funds in his official possession, for damage to person or property
caused by his own or his employee's passive negligence. 21
The Commission, after an extended and thorough research study, concluded that the rule was in conflict with the legal rules applying in similar
situations, undesirable in its social consequences and unjust. The bill originally drawn was subject to the possible criticism that it might hold the receiver
personally liable for passive negligence. Though this was corrected by
amendment, the bill nevertheless failed to pass. 22

The recommendation of

the Commission is sound, corrects an unjust situation, and should be enacted
into law.

4. Risk of loss in executory contracts for the sale of real property. The
rule, based upon the technical doctrine of equitable conversion, that risk of
loss passes to the purchaser as soon as he enters into a contract to buy realty
has been abrogated by a statute recommended by the Commission and supported by a scientific research study.23 The Commission used as a basis for
its bill the act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Numerous changes were made in the act, but the basic
idea, that risk of loss should shift only with a shift in possession or in legal
title, was retained. Indicative of the careful treatment that this problem
received was the recommendation of a specific bill protecting the vendor
against impairment of his fire insurance protection in the interim between
the making of the contract and the transfer of possession.2 4

5. The seal and consideration. This is perhaps the most comprehensive
study thus far made by the Commission. Aware of the frequent criticisms
of the technicalities of the doctrines of consideration and of the seal, the
Commission undertook a broad examination of the two fields. Its study
is divided into four parts: (a) The Development of the Doctrine of Consideration, prepared by Professor Horace E. Whiteside, of the Cornell Law
School-a thorough study of the history of the Anglo-American doctrine of
consideration and of the modern problems arising under that doctrine; (b)
The Cointerpart of Consideration in Foreigi Legal Systems, by Professor
A. Arthur Schiller, of the Columbia Law School-a scholarly and interesting
exposition of causa in Roman and modern continental law and its application
to various specific situations; (c) A Promise to Perform or the Performance
'Women's Hospital v. Loubern Realty Corp., 266 N. Y. 123, 194 N. E. 56 (1934).
"Supra note 15, at 625, 1927.
"Supra note 15, at 761.
"Supra note 15, at 762.
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of a Pre-Existing Duty as Consideration;and (d) Doctrines Relating to the
Seal. The third and fourth divisions of the study were prepared by research
assistants of the Commission under the direction of its Director of Research.
As early as 1765, Lord Mansfield held in a commercial case that a promise in writing was enforceable without regard to consideration. 25 The de26
cision of this distinguished judge was overruled, however, by a later case.
Though modern business conditions are thought by many persons to require
that a written promise should be enforceable despite the absence of a technical consideration, the Commission has not yet indicated that it is ready to
go this far with respect to the formation of new contracts.
The Commission did, however, attack the problem of consideration where
changes are made in existing contracts or vihere an existing obligation is discharged by agreement. Under the old law, it was the general rule that to
change or discharge an existing contract required a' consideration. 27 The
Commission recommended and secured the enactment of a statute which enforces an agreement to change or discharge a contract, or other obligation,
without regard to consideration, provided it is in writing.28 The requirement of a writing is a recognition of the good commercial sense of Lord
Mansfield's decision and an appreciation of the vagaries of oral proof in this
type of situation. The new statute abrogates the rule laid down in Pinnel's
Case 9 and in Foakes v. Beer,8 ° long unwillingly followed by the courts, that
a lesser sum cannot be satisfaction for a greater sum due.
The same subcommittee which dealt with consideration embarked upon a
complete study of the question of the seal. In all probability no recommendation would have been made by the Commission until the subject had been
studied in all its aspects. The situation was complicated, however, by the
fact that two bills dealing with aspects of this problem were introduced in the
Legislature, independently of the Commission, and enacted into law.81 These
bills did not meet with the approval of the Commission-one as to form, the
other as to substance. To secure the repeal of the latter and to clarify ambiguities in the former, the Commission prepared and introduced its own
bill.

32

As a result of the Commission's recommendations, the seal no longer
has any effect on consideration,83 a sealed instrument may be varied by an
'Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663 (1765).
'Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350 n. a. (1778).
'There are of course, exceptions to this general rule. McKenzie v. Harrison, 120
N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458 (1890).
*Supranote 15, at 71.

'5 Coke 117.

'9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
'Laws 1935, c. 708; Laws 1936, c. 353.
'See supra note 15, 74-77, 1038, 1039.
"Laws 1936, c. 685.
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executory written agreement, 34 and an undisclosed principal can sue
or be sued on an instrument under seal. 35 The Commission undoubtedly
will continue its studies of other problems arising in connection with the use
of the seal. These include, for example, the effect of a seal on the Statute of
Limitations and the necessity that the authority of an agent who is to execute
a sealed instrument be itself under seal.
A further problem was raised as to whether a release without consideration
was valid.30 The Commission believed, and rightly so, that all doubt as to the
efficacy of this simple device for ending claims and litigation ought to be set
at rest. A statute was therefore recommended and enacted making a release
37
in writing valid despite the absence of consideration or a seal.

6. Rule against perpetuities and spendthrift trusts. One of the most
important subjects undertaken for study by the Law Revision Commission
was the rule against perpetuities and related matters. The rule in New York.
the result of the revision of 1828, allows the power of alienation of both
land and personalty to be suspended only for two lives in being, plus a minority where a contingent remainder in fee is limited on a prior remainder in
fee.37
Although the rule has been in existence without substantial change
for over one hundred years, there is still confusion and uncertainty in the
law. As eminent an authority as Professor John Chipman Gray stated in
1886, and reiterated in 1915, that: "In no civilized country is the making
of a will so delicate an operation, and so likely to fail of success, as in New
York."'
A study was made for the Commission by two experts in the field, Professor Richard R. Powell of the Columbia Law School and Professor Horace
E. Whiteside of Cornell. After acting upon their proposals, the Commission
submitted a tentative draft of a series of changes in the Real and Personal
Property Laws to the Committee of the New York State Bar Association
appointed to cooperate with the Commission, and to Surrogates Foley,
Slater, and Wingate, members of the Commission to Investigate Defects in
the Laws of Estates. This last Commission studied the question several
years ago and reported against any change in the law.
Objections were made to that portion of the draft bill which would change
'Ibid.
8'Ibid.
T
Supra note 15, at 11, 13, 14.
'"Laws 1936, c. 222.
"REAL PROP. LAW § 42; PERS. PROP. LAW § 11.
8GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1886 ed.) § 750,
(1915 ed.) § 750.
-N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1933) No. 55, 7-18.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the two-lives rules to allow the use of lives in being generally together with
the minorities of persons in being at the end of the measuring lives, or, in the
alternative, a flat period of not more than 21 years. As stated in the communication of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature, the objection was made ".

.

. that during the present period of depression-however

valid the criticism directed against the present New York rule-there should
be no lengthening of the 'permissible period,' because even under the twolives rule, a serious situation has resulted from frozen assets, lack of income
for cestuis, and defaults in mortgages, mortgage participations and guaranteed
'40
mortgage certificates.
The objections were especially directed at the possible lengthening of the
permissible period for which a spendthrift or inalienable trust might be set
up. The Commission, recognizing this as a criticism of the law of trusts
in this state, has indicated its intention of making a study of the law relating
to spendthrift trusts and other matters pertaining to the administration of
trust estates before making a recommendation to the Legislature. 41
In the meantime, the tentative draft statute of proposed changes has been
made available to bench and bar. Wide consideration may be given to the
proposals, and salutary criticisms and suggestions should result. When the
study of the trust problems has been completed, the entire question can be
taken up as a whole. The Commission is to be commended for its scholarly
and careful approach in this matter. The subject is one of extreme difficulty
and importance and well deserves a few years of the most painstaking consideration.

7. Expert testimony. The Commission is conducting a broad survey of
the field of expert testimony, and has divided the topic into three categories:
the expert in personal injury actions; the use of the expert on lunacy commissions; the use of the expert in criminal proceedings. The 1936 report
contains a comprehensive introduction to the entire problem and a detailed
study of the expert in personal injury actions. The statute recommended
by the Commission deals only with the use of expert testimony in such actions.

42

A serious abuse of expert testimony in personal injury actions is the
role assumed by the expert as protagonist of the party who calls him and
pays his fee. Clashes between experts called by opposing parties and deliberate attempts to confuse the jury by using highly technical language often
result. The Commission recommended that the court be given power in a
Supra note 15, at 481.
USupra note 15, at 19, 20, 482.
"Supra note 15, at 801, 802.
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personal injury action to call a disinterested and impartial expert on its own
motion. 43 This expert would then make a physical examination of the injured person and submit a written report under oath to the judge. Copies
of the report would be furnished to the opposing attorneys and either side,
or the judge, could call the expert to the witness stand. The expert's fees,
to be fixed by the court, would be paid by the parties, either equally or in
such proportion as the court might fix, and would be taxed as costs in the
action.
Experience alone can demonstrate whether or not the proposed plan is
practicable. In the Commission's judgment, however, the experiment was
worth trying, not only for the positive benefit to be derived from the findings
of an impartial expert, but also for the negative effect the threat of a disinterested expert would have on those called by the parties themselves. The recommendation of the Commision is conservative and reasonably calculated to accomplish a needed reform in the use of expert testimony in personal injury
actions. There is no doubt that abuses exist in this field. It is to be hoped that
further study will result in recommendations that will meet with legislative
approval.

Those interested in the work of the Commission will find in this Report a
list of law reform projects from among which the Commission proposes to
select subjects for future study.44 The Commission very properly fails to
list among those projects a study of our matrimonial and divorce laws. While
a thorough scientific investigation of these laws and how they operate is most
essential, it should be by a special commission created for that purpose. It
would be unwise, for many obvious reasons, for the Law Revision Commission to attempt this difficult and highly controversial task. Whether the Commission should engage in a research study of the operation of our laws relating to negligence and determine if the principles of the Workmen's Compensation Law should be extended to cover motor vehicle accidents is more debatable. In any event, it would be helpful if the Commission would decide
at an early date whether or not it will embark upon this study itself, so that,
in the event it concludes not to, an appeal may be made to the Legislature for
the creation of a special commission for this purpose.
We have seen that one of the duties of the Commission is, in appropriate
instances, 'to draft remedial legislation embodying its recommendations for
changes in the existing law. This is a delicate task requiring the greatest
patience and skill. Wisely, I believe, the Commission has decided, so far
as practicable, to submit its proposed bills to committees of various bar asso"Ibid.

"Supra note 15, at 24.
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ciations and to members of the bench for criticism and suggestions before
transmitting them to the Legislature. "The power of legislation," said Professor Ames, "is a dangerous weapon. Every lawyer can recall instances of
unintelligent, mischievous tampering with established rules of law." 45 The
drafting of legislation is a scientific experiment with words-a search for the
11ot juste, the careful adjustment of language, and the choice of alternative
modes of expression. There is no fixity in the meaning of words, and nobody
on this side of the looking glass can say with Humpty-Dumpty: "When I
use a word it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
An expert legislative draftsman must possess a certain amount of humility,
and this regardless of his estate. An interesting story is told in this connection. "Once, when they sat together considering the drafting of a bill, Balfour suggested the alteration of one word in Ashbourne's draft. 'I like
that word,' said the Lord Chancellor, 'I wouldn't alter it.' 'Ah,' rejoined
Balfour quietly, 'then perhaps you could put it into another Act.'"46
Gulliver, in describing the laws of the land of Brobdingnag, noted that "no
law of that country must exceed in words the number of letters in their alphabet, which consists only in two and twenty. But, indeed, few of them extend
even to that length. They are expressed in the most plain and simple terms,
wherein those people are not mercurial enough to discover above one interpretation. '4 7 Though this level of simplicity be for us unattainable, draftsmanship should aim at something akin to it. To say what you have to say in
the simplest, most direct and exact manner possible, with no surplusage "that
the means towards its approximation.
Schopenhauer's observation "that
thought so far follows the law of gravity that it travels from head to paper
much more easily than from paper to bead" commands the attention of all who
draft legislation.
The Commission is to be congratulated on the constructive achievements
accomplished in the first two years of its existence. It is a happy augury
of what may be expected in the future. The Commission has already won,
and deservedly so, the confidence and support of the bar, with whom it is
working in close co6peration. The character of the Commission's work, combining, as it does, scientific legal scholarship and social utility, is at once an
inspiration to legal students and practitioners everywhere and a realization
of the hopes and expectations of those who urged its creation. How gratifying it must have been to Mr. Justice Cardozo, whose name will ever be
identified with this agency, to read this report of the ministry which is surveying "the body of our law patiently and calmly and deliberately, attempting no
'5Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor,LEcTuREs ON
367.
'"MARJORIBANKS, CARSON THE ADVOCATE (1932) 93.
' 7Quoted in CLAUD MULLINS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 113.
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sudden transformation, not cutting at the roots of centuries, the product of
people's life in its gradual evolution, but pruning and transplanting here and
there with careful and loving hands..." 48
With both Law Revision Commission and Judicial Council operating efficiently and courageously, the people of the state may look hopefully to the
day when our system of law will be made "the best possible instrument of
justice."
'Quoted in Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice,
(1934) No. 50, p. 55.
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